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首页> 外文期刊>Discrete dynamics in nature and society >Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer
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Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer

机译：在公平偏好和补贴对制造商的联合行动下绿色供应链的最佳决策

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Government subsidy promotes the development of green supply chain, and the influence of decision-makers’ behavioral preferences becomes increasingly prominent in green supply chain management. In order to further enrich the research content of green supply chain, we first use Stackelberg game theory to construct game models by taking the product green degree, wholesale price and retail price as the decision variables, then we work out the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer under four decision scenarios, and reveal the impact differences between the two parties’ fairness preference behaviors. Our research mainly has the following findings: Firstly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer can benefit these two parties and can have certain impact on the optimal decisions only by working with the green product market expansion efficiency. Secondly, these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors can cause serious damage to the other party’s profit and the overall profit of green supply chain, and increase the rate of their own profit in the overall profit of green supply chain, but the difference is that the retailer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater decline in product green degree and wholesale price, and when certain conditions are met, its own profit may rise compared to its fairness neutral, while the manufacturer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater damage to the overall profit of green supply chainand make its own profit always be lower than its fairness neutral. Thirdly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer and the fairness preference behaviors of both parties can cause a stack effect on the optimal solutions, which means that the subsidy government provides for the manufacturer can aggravate the negative influence caused by these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors.
机译：政府补贴促进了绿色供应链的发展，决策者的行为偏好的影响在绿色供应链管理中变得越来越突出。为了进一步丰富绿色供应链的研究内容，我们首先使用Stackelberg博弈论通过将产品绿色学位，批发价格和零售价格作为决策变量来构建游戏模型，然后我们制造制造商的均衡策略和零售商在四种决策情景下，并揭示了双方的公平偏好行为之间的影响差异。我们的研究主要有以下发现：首先，政府对制造商的补贴可以使这两方有益，并且只有通过使用绿色产品市场扩张效率，才能对最佳决策产生一定影响。其次，这两个方的公平偏好行为可能会对对方的利润和绿色供应链的整体利润造成严重损害，并提高绿色供应链整体利润的利润率，但差异是零售商的公平偏好行为可能导致产品绿色学位和批发价格下降，而当满足某些条件时，与其公平中立相比，其自身的利润可能会上升，而制造商的公平偏好行为可能会对整体利润造成更大的损害绿色供应链，使其自身利润总是低于其公平中性。第三，政府对制造商的补贴和双方的公平偏好行为可能导致对最佳解决方案的堆栈影响，这意味着补贴政府规定的制造商可以加剧这两方的公平偏好行为造成的负面影响。

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