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Stealthy Sensor Attacks for Plants Modeled by Labeled Petri Nets ?

机译:由标记的Petri网建模的植物的隐身传感器攻击

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The problem of stealthy sensor attacks for labeled Petri nets is considered. An operator observes the plant to establish if a set of critical markings has been reached. The attacker can corrupt the sensor channels that transmit the sensor readings, making the operator incapable to establish when a critical marking is reached. We first construct the stealthy attack Petri net that keeps into account the real plant evolutions observed by the attacker and the corrupted plant evolutions observed by the operator. Starting from the reachability graph of the stealthy attack Petri net, an attack structure is defined: it describes all possible attacks. The supremal stealthy attack substructure can be obtained by appropriately trimming the attack structure. An attack function is effective if the supremal stealthy attack substructure contains a state whose first element is a critical marking and the second element is a noncritical marking.
机译:考虑了标有培养网的隐身传感器攻击问题。操作员观察工厂是否已建立一组关键标记。攻击者可以破坏传输传感器读数的传感器通道,使操作员无法在达到关键标记时建立。我们首先构建隐身的攻击培训培训,这仍然考虑了攻击者观察到的真实植物进度和经营者观察到的植物演进。从隐形攻击Petri Net的可达性图开始,定义了攻击结构:它描述了所有可能的攻击。通过适当地修剪攻击结构,可以获得至尊隐秘的攻击子结构。如果最重要的隐身攻击子结构包含第一元素是关键标记的状态,则攻击功能是有效的,并且第二元素是非临界标记。

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