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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies >Trade, security, and authoritarianism: domestic politics of foreign policy making in China
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Trade, security, and authoritarianism: domestic politics of foreign policy making in China

机译：贸易，安全和威权主义：中国外交政策的国内政治

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Could trade bring security and stability to international relations? China has become one of the most important players in the global economy without being democratized. In this article, I present a game-theoretic model in which an authoritarian state would behave more cooperatively in international relations if internationalists are empowered vis-à-vis hardliners in domestic politics. Reformists and internationalists are likely partners. The reformists have a strong incentive to use the free trade agreements’ (FTAs) stipulating domestic regulations as external pressure to advance structural reforms: they see intra-industry trade, enhanced by global value chains (GVCs), as a means to achieve sustainable economic growth. This article breaks down the broader claim that FTAs regulating GVCs-based intra-industry trade are connected to regional security in two steps: first, FTAs empower the reformist-internationalist coalition; and second, the empowered reformist internationalists make the state’s behavior more cooperative in the international sphere. The model’s equilibrium outcome implies that the FTAs that require the signatories to be committed to domestic economic reforms will promote international cooperation and strengthen regional security by empowering people who favor reform and internationalism in each state’s domestic politics. This means, if an authoritarian state is involved in the global economy and benefits from international economic transactions, like China does, then concluding and spreading FTAs requiring domestic economic reforms would be more effective policy to bring security and stability than promoting democratic transitions.
机译：可以交易为国际关系带来安全和稳定吗？中国已成为全球经济中最重要的球员之一，而不被民主化。在本文中，我提出了一个游戏 - 理论模型，其中授权国家在国内政治中授权Vis-à-异丁师授权的国际关系中，在国际关系中表现得更合作。改革派和国际主义可能是合作伙伴。改革主义者有强烈的激励，利用规定国内法规的自由贸易协定（自由贸易协定）作为外部压力推进结构改革：他们看到了行业内的贸易，由全球价值链（GVC）增强，作为实现可持续经济的手段生长。本文突破了更广泛的声明，即加入资助全国基于GVCS的内部行业贸易有两步与区域安全有关：第一，FTA授权改革 - 国际主义联盟;其次，赋权改革主义国际主义者使国家在国际领域更合作的行为。该模型的均衡结果意味着要求签署国内经济改革的FTA将促进国际合作，并通过赋予每个州国内政治的改革和国际主义的人来加强区域安全。这意味着，如果授权国家涉及全球经济和国际经济交易的利益，那么如中国所做的那样，那么要求国内经济改革的总结和传播的自由贷款将更有效的政策，以实现安全和稳定性，而不是促进民主转型。

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