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首页> 外文期刊>Ecological Economics >Effects of Bribery on Firms' Environmental Innovation Adoption in Vietnam: Mediating Roles of Firms' Bargaining Power and Credit and Institutional Constraints
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Effects of Bribery on Firms' Environmental Innovation Adoption in Vietnam: Mediating Roles of Firms' Bargaining Power and Credit and Institutional Constraints

机译：贿赂对越南企业环境创新采纳的影响：介导的企业谈判权力和信贷制约因素

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摘要

This paper uses survey data of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam, from 2011 to 2015, to examine the effects of bribery on environmental innovation decisions by firms, accounting for the roles of bargaining power and/or credit and institutional constraints. In the study, bribery activities are categorized into greasing and rent-seeking forms. Self-assessment of firms on the uncertainty of government policies and the competition environment is used to capture institutional constraints, while firm size and legal registration status are used to represent bargaining power. The group of credit-constrained firms is further broken down into those that have demand for more loans and those not currently looking for a loan application. Our empirical results provide evidence that greasing bribery has a positive effect on firms? decisions about implementation of environmental innovation (the ?greasing-the-wheels? hypothesis) while there is no impact from rent-seeking bribery. The positive effect of greasing bribery is particularly sizable for large, formally registered firms, or those facing no credit constraints, while specific types of institutional constraints that firms perceive as obstacles to their growth also affect the magnitude of the impact. Lastly, when endogeneity is controlled, the effect of greasing bribery becomes more pronounced and there is evidence on the ?sanding-the-wheels? hypothesis of rent-seeking bribery.
机译：本文采用了越南中小企业（中小企业）的调查数据，从2011年到2015年，审查了贿赂对公司环境创新决策的影响，占谈判权力和/或信贷和机构限制的角色。在研究中，贿赂活动被分类为润滑和寻租形式。公司对政府政策不确定性的自我评估，旨在捕捉机构限制，而坚定的规模和法律登记地位用于代表讨价还价权。该组信贷受累公司进一步分解为需要更多贷款的人和目前正在寻求贷款申请的人员。我们的经验结果提供了证据表明润滑贿赂对公司有积极影响？关于环境创新实施的决定（？稀释 - 轮子？假设），而寻求贿赂没有影响。润滑贿赂的积极作用对于大型，正式注册的公司或面临的人特别大幅度，而没有信贷限制，而企业认为其生长的障碍也影响了影响的特定类型的制度限制。最后，当控制内生性时，润滑贿赂的效果变得更加明显，有证据？打磨 - 轮子？寻求租金贿赂假设。

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