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Winners and losers of central bank foreign exchange interventions

机译：中央银行外汇干预的获奖者和输家

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摘要

Interventions in foreign exchange markets are indispensable for most central banks and recent years have witnessed an increase in their frequency and magnitude. However, little is known about their implications on agents' welfare. This paper investigates the topic by employing a small open economy DSGE model with savers and borrowers in both local and foreign currencies, where the central bank intervenes to smooth out exchange rate volatility by changing its foreign reserve. Interventions occur following the foreigners' decision to sell (or buy) domestic assets, thus weakening (or strengthening) the local currency. The model allows the disentanglement of welfare implications by type of agent and source of exchange rate imbalance, which is novel in the literature, providing useful insight for central bankers. The findings highlight the benefits of interventions in the case of foreign financial shocks, especially when the level of currency mismatch in the economy is high. However, when exchange rate disequilibrium stems from domestic developments, the intervention generates winners and losers.
机译：外汇市场的干预措施对于大多数央行而言，最近年来的频率和幅度的增加是不可或缺的。然而，对他们对代理商的福利的影响很少。本文通过将小型开放经济DSGE模型与本地和外币的储蓄者一起使用小型开放经济DSGE模型来调查该主题，中央银行通过改变其外汇储存来平稳地换出汇率波动。在外国人的决定出售（或购买）国内资产后，干预措施发生，从而削弱（或加强）当地货币。该模型允许通过代理人的代理和汇率不平衡的福利造成的解剖，这是在文献中的新颖，为中央银行人员提供了有用的见解。调查结果突出了外国金融冲击的干预措施，特别是当经济中的货币水平高时。然而，当汇率不平衡源于国内发展时，干预会产生赢家和输家。

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