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An intersubjective model of agency for game theory

机译:博弈论代理机构的误差模型

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This paper proposes a new interpretation of non-cooperative games that shows why the unilateralism of best-reply reasoning fails to capture the mutuality of strategic interdependence. Drawing on anintersubjectiveapproach to theorizing individual agency in shared context, including a non-individualistic model of common belief without infinite regress, the paper develops a general model of a 2 x 2 simultaneous one-shot non-cooperative game and applies it to games including Hi-Lo, Stag Hunt, Prisoners' Dilemma, Chicken, BoS and Matching Pennies. Results includeHighas the rational choice in Hi-Lo, andCooperateas a possible rational choice in the Prisoners' Dilemma.
机译:本文提出了对非合作游戏的新解释,表明为什么最佳回复推理的单侧主义未能捕捉战略相互依存的相互性。在AnIntersubjectiveApproach上绘制在共享背景下的个人机构,包括一个非个人主义模型,包括一个没有无限的回归的共同信念,开发了一个2 x 2同时一击非合作游戏的一般模型,并将其应用于包括嗨的游戏-lo,雄鹿狩猎,囚犯困境,鸡肉,bos和匹配的便士。结果包括在HI-LO,ANDCOOPERATEAS中的理性选择在囚犯困境中可能的理性选择。

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