首页> 外文期刊>Economics & philosophy >HOW CHANGES IN ONE'S PREFERENCES CAN AFFECT ONE'S FREEDOM (AND HOW THEY CANNOT): A REPLY TO DOWDING AND VAN HEES
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HOW CHANGES IN ONE'S PREFERENCES CAN AFFECT ONE'S FREEDOM (AND HOW THEY CANNOT): A REPLY TO DOWDING AND VAN HEES

机译:人称偏好的变化如何影响人的自由(他们不能做到):对道夫和范希的答复

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摘要

How is a person's freedom related to his or her preferences? Liberal theorists of negative freedom have generally taken the view that the desire of a person to do or not do something is irrelevant to the question of whether he is free to do it. Supporters of the "pure negative" conception of freedom have advocated this view in its starkest form: they maintain that a person is unfree to Φ if and only if he is prevented from Φ-ing by the conduct or dispositions of some other person(s) (Steiner, 1994; Carter, 1999; Kramer, 2003). This definition of freedom is value-neutral in the sense that no reference is made to preferences over options or indeed to any other indicators of the values of options, either in the characterization of "Φ-ing" itself (any conduct fits the bill) or in the characterization of the way in which Φ-ing can be constrained (any prevention counts as a constraint on freedom).
机译:一个人的自由与他或她的喜好有何关系?消极自由的自由主义理论家普遍认为,一个人做某事或不做某事的愿望与他是否有自由做某事的问题无关。支持“纯粹否定”自由的观念以最鲜明的形式提倡这种观点:他们坚持认为,一个人只有在由于其他人的行为或性格被阻止而无法获得自由的情况下,才对自由不自由。 (Steiner,1994; Carter,1999; Kramer,2003)。这种自由的定义是价值中立的,在某种意义上,没有提到对期权的偏爱,也没有提及期权价值的任何其他指标,无论是“Φing”本身的表征(任何行为都符合法案)或表征Φ-ing的约束方式(任何预防措施都应视为对自由的限制)。

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