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首页> 外文期刊>Economics of governance >Political incentives in firms'financial reporting: evidence from the crackdown on corrupt municipal officials
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Political incentives in firms'financial reporting: evidence from the crackdown on corrupt municipal officials

机译：企业财务报告中的政治诱因：来自对腐败的市政官员的镇压证据

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摘要

This paper examines political incentives in firms' financial reporting during the anti-corruption campaign in China. We find robust evidence that the turnover of municipal officials due to the prosecution of corruption causes affiliated firms to strategically withhold good news relative to bad news. This effect is more pronounced among state-owned firms and firms located in highly corrupt places, while it is depressed among firms with the big-four auditing firms and among firms with Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors. Further tests show that this effect is temporary. We find affiliated firms release minor bad news on time and withhold minor good news during the turnover of corrupt municipal officials. Overall, our study provides novel evidence that firms have political incentives in financial reporting regarding the release of good and bad news, and the anti-corruption campaign in China can act as a governance mechanism to temporarily improve the financial reporting environment.
机译：本文考察了中国反腐败运动中企业财务报告中的政治动机。我们发现有力的证据表明，由于起诉腐败而导致市政官员的离职使关联公司从战略上隐瞒好消息，而不是坏消息。在国有公司和位于高度腐败地方的公司中，这种影响更为明显，而在拥有四大审计公司的公司中以及在具有合格外国机构投资者的公司中，这种影响却受到抑制。进一步的测试表明，这种影响是暂时的。我们发现，关联公司会及时发布一些小坏消息，而在腐败的市政官员离职期间保留一些小好消息。总体而言，我们的研究提供了新颖的证据，表明公司在财务报告方面具有关于释放好消息和坏消息的政治动机，而中国的反腐败运动可以作为一种治理机制，以暂时改善财务报告环境。

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