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Weekend racer: cheating and self-governance in road racing

机译:周末赛车手:公路赛车中的作弊和自我管理

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This paper studies how reputation enforces socially cooperative behavior in road racing in the New Orleans metro area. We find that reputation mechanisms have a much stronger effect for frequent road racers than for members of the New Orleans Track Club. We find that club membership cuts cheating in half while a runner who has finished at least one-third of the 2013 running season does not cheat. Thus, self-governance eliminates corruption when there is a reputational mechanism in place. Since data on informal running clubs are unavailable, our analysis underestimates the effect of club membership on socially cooperative behavior in road racing.
机译:本文研究了声誉如何在新奥尔良都会区的公路赛车中增强社会合作行为。我们发现,声誉机制对公路赛车手的影响要比对新奥尔良田径俱乐部的影响大得多。我们发现俱乐部会员资格减少了一半的欺骗,而至少完成了2013运营季三分之一的跑步者没有欺骗。因此,在存在声誉机制的情况下,自治可以消除腐败。由于没有关于非正式跑步俱乐部的数据,因此我们的分析低估了俱乐部会员资格对公路赛车中社会合作行为的影响。

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