首页> 外文期刊>Economics of governance >Economics of evaluation (with special reference to promotion and tenure committees)
【24h】

Economics of evaluation (with special reference to promotion and tenure committees)

机译:评估经济学(特别参考晋升和任期委员会)

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

Previous research suggests that universities that fear tenuring bad candidates more than they fear rejecting good candidates would optimally have both department and outside evaluating committees. I find that a higher relative cost of accepting bad candidates is neither necessary nor sufficient for the optimality of more than one committee. Also, with some probability, t, the administration will tenure one with split recommendations from two committees, if one committee is more accurate than the other, one structure will have fewer errors of both types for some range of t, and possibly a lower expected loss from errors for all t.
机译:先前的研究表明,大学担心对优秀候选人的任期要比对拒绝优秀候选人的恐惧更担心,这样才能最好地设置部门和外部评估委员会。我发现,要接受一个以上委员会的最佳选择,接受不良候选人的相对成本既不必要也不充分。同样,在一定的概率t下,政府将在两个委员会的分拆建议下任职一个,如果一个委员会比另一个委员会更准确,则在某个t范围内,一个结构的两种类型的错误都较少,并且预期值可能更低所有t的错误损失。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号