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Alternation of parties in power and economic volatility: testing the rational partisan hypothesis and policy learning hypothesis

机译：政党权力和经济波动的交替：检验理性的党派假设和政策学习假设

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Right and left parties have distinct macroeconomic preferences that could create different levels of volatility during their executive tenures. But rational partisan theory argues that, because actors in the economy anticipate ruling party behavior, partisan differences only matter when election outcomes are uncertain. We argue that policy risk from ruling parties extends beyond elections, leading to important variation in growth volatility that occurs during a ruling party's tenure. Building on theories of policy risk and learning, we argue that after elections, economic actors still face uncertainty about the policies of new ruling parties. With time in power, new ruling parties build policy track records, reducing policy risk and, thus, volatility. We estimate a learning curve model of ruling party duration's effect on the variation in quarterly GDP growth rates. Using data from 44 democracies between 1981 and 2009, we find that learning processes extend beyond the conclusion of uncertain elections.
机译：左，右党派在宏观经济偏好上截然不同，这可能会在其执行任期内造成不同程度的波动。但是理性的党派理论认为，由于经济中的参与者会预料执政党的行为，因此党派分歧仅在选举结果不确定时才重要。我们认为，执政党的政策风险已超出选举范围，导致执政党任职期间增长波动性发生重大变化。基于政策风险和学习的理论，我们认为选举后，经济参与者仍然面临新执政党政策的不确定性。随着时间的推移，新执政党将建立政策跟踪记录，从而降低政策风险，从而降低波动性。我们估计了执政党任期对季度GDP增长率变化的影响的学习曲线模型。利用1981年至2009年间44个民主国家的数据，我们发现学习过程超出了不确定选举的结论。

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