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Appeasement and compromise under a referendum threat

机译：公民投票威胁下的靖与妥协

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摘要

Standard legislative bargaining models assume that an agreed-upon allocation is final, whereas in practice there exist mechanisms for challenging passed legislation when there is lack of sufficient consensus. Such mechanisms include popular vote requirements following insufficient majorities in the legislature. This paper analyzes a one-period legislative bargaining game whose outcome can be challenged through a referendum. I study the effects of this institution on the bills passed in the legislature and analyze the incentives it provides for reaching legislative deals. The proposer party's trade-off between a larger winning prize and a more threatening opponent in the referendum summarizes the bargaining problem. The results indicate that measures of post-bargaining power do not necessarily translate into higher equilibrium payoffs and that the equilibrium bill may include no concessions from the majority to the minority party. Moreover, caps on campaign spending may incentivize a costly referendum over unanimity in the legislature. These results carry policy implications for regulating various forms of post-bargaining power, such as campaign finance laws for referenda.
机译：标准的立法谈判模型假定商定的分配是最终的，而在实践中，当缺乏足够的共识时，存在对已通过的立法提出质疑的机制。这样的机制包括在立法机构多数不赞成之后进行的公众投票要求。本文分析了一个为期一个立法的议价博弈，其结果可以通过全民公决来挑战。我研究了该机构对立法机关通过的法案的影响，并分析了其为达成立法交易提供的动力。在全民投票中，提议者党在较大的获胜奖赏和更具威胁性的对手之间进行权衡，总结了讨价还价的问题。结果表明，讨价还价能力的度量并不一定会转化为更高的均衡收益，而且均衡法案可能不会包括从多数党到少数党的让步。此外，限制竞选支出可能会激发高昂的全民投票，以反对立法机关的一致意见。这些结果对规范各种形式的议价后权力具有政策意义，例如，全民公决的竞选财务法。

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