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Manager replacement, employee protest, and corporate control

机译:更换经理,员工抗议和公司控制

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摘要

When faced with the replacement threat, incumbent managers look for support from employees by investing in a non-contractible employee-friendly relationship. Enjoying the relationship, employees help managers preserve their job by protesting against shareholders. When the benefits from the good employee-manager relationship are large enough to cover the loss of managerial inefficiency, shareholders prefer to share the influential power at the firm with employees.
机译:面对更换威胁时,现任经理会通过投资于一种不可收缩的员工友好关系来寻求员工的支持。享受这种关系,员工可以通过抗议股东来帮助经理们保住工作。当良好的员工与经理关系带来的好处足以弥补管理效率低下的损失时,股东更愿意与员工分享公司的影响力。

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