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首页> 外文期刊>Economics of governance >Voice, exit and local capture in public provision of private goods
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Voice, exit and local capture in public provision of private goods

机译：公共提供私人物品时的声音，出口和当地捕获

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摘要

We developed a simple model on publicly provided private goods, such as health or education that highlights a vicious cycle faced by many developing countries. When public services are not of high quality due to mismanagement or corruption, the wealthy may switch to private alternatives. Their exit weakens the influence of citizen voice over politicians, since that leaves the poor as the only constituent with a stake in good governance. As the civic control over local governments weakens, government's concern for social welfare declines even further, leading to more corruption and more corrosion in the quality of public services. Our model shows that establishing institutions (such as local taxation) that spread the costs and benefits of governance across the whole society is crucial for the success of local governments. Empirical results from the Philippines support this hypothesis.
机译：我们针对公共提供的私人物品（例如健康或教育）开发了一个简单的模型，该模型突出了许多发展中国家面临的恶性循环。当由于管理不善或腐败而导致公共服务质量不高时，富人可能会转向私人选择。他们的退出削弱了公民对政客的声音的影响，因为这使穷人成为唯一与善治息息相关的成员。随着对地方政府的公民控制能力减弱，政府对社会福利的关注进一步降低，导致更多的腐败和公共服务质量的进一步恶化。我们的模型表明，建立能够在整个社会范围内分散治理成本和收益的机构（例如地方税收）对于地方政府的成功至关重要。菲律宾的经验结果支持这一假设。

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