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Rights and judicial independence

机译：权利与司法独立

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摘要

This paper models endogenous judicial independence (JI) as a commitment device in a political commitment game between a ruler and citizens. In a situation where citizens can observe the effectiveness of JI with some positive probability, the model shows that the ruler in fact creates an independent judiciary and credibly commits to an announced tax rate, i.e., the ruler protects private property rights. Even when citizens have no chance to observe the effectiveness of JI, the ruler can still guarantee property rights by granting human rights as a signal of JI. Although the creation of JI achieves a Pareto improvement compared with its lack, two sources of inefficiency arise. First, the equilibrium tax is inefficiently high in the sense that the tax rate is on the inefficient side of the Laffer curve. This inefficiently high tax reflects the cost of credible commitment. Second, equilibrium JI for guaranteeing human rights is inefficiently high in the sense that the ruler does not entirely use JI for credibly committing to a low tax. This inefficiently high JI represents the cost of credible signalling.
机译：本文将内生的司法独立（JI）建模为统治者与公民之间的政治承诺博弈中的承诺工具。在公民可以一定的概率观察到联合执行的有效性的情况下，该模型表明，统治者实际上创建了一个独立的司法机构，并可靠地致力于宣布的税率，即统治者保护了私有财产权。即使公民没有机会观察到JI的有效性，统治者仍然可以通过授予人权作为JI的信号来保证财产权。尽管创建JI与缺少JI相比可实现帕累托改进，但效率低下的原因有两个。首先，就税率处于拉弗曲线的低效率这一点而言，均衡税的效率低下。这种低效的高税收反映了可信承诺的成本。其次，从统治者并未完全使用JI可靠地承担低税的意义上说，用于保障人权的均衡JI效率低下。这种低效率的JI代表了可靠信令的成本。

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