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Electoral accountability and local government efficiency: quasi-experimental evidence from the Italian health care sector reforms

机译:选举问责制和地方政府效率:意大利医疗保健部门改革的准实验证据

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摘要

This paper evaluates the effect of two policy changes on the efficiency of Italian regional governments in the provision of health care services: first a change in the electoral system, second a process of fiscal decentralisation. The paper provides two main contributions: (1) a comprehensive analysis of the two main reforms that involved Italian regional governments and the health care sector during the 1990s, (2) the evaluation of the impact of the electoral reform in a quasi-experimental setting. Final results are in line with recent theoretical predictions that show a positive relationship between government efficiency and the electoral accountability enhanced by institutions such as electoral rules and fiscal decentralisation.
机译:本文评估了两项政策变化对意大利地区政府在提供医疗服务方面的效率的影响:首先是选举制度的变化,其次是财政分权的过程。该文件提供了两个主要贡献:(1)对1990年代意大利地区政府和医疗保健部门参与的两项主要改革进行了全面分析,(2)在准实验环境下评估选举改革的影响。最终结果与最近的理论预测一致,后者表明政府效率与通过选举规则和财政分权等机构增强的选举责任制之间存在正相关关系。

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