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Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight

机译：公务员的政治选拔和议会监督

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摘要

In this paper, we propose a framework to integrate the identity of legislators in a politico economic analysis of parliamentary oversight. Legislators decide about the effort they invest in oversight activities depending on their individual control costs and the level of electoral competition. We focus on public servants elected to parliament who face a conflict of interests but also have lower control costs due to their experience and information advantage. If held accountable, oversight becomes a relatively attractive activity for them to win votes. For German Laender, we find that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively related to the number of submitted parliamentary interpellations. This result holds when instrumenting the fraction of public servants in parliament with its institutional determinants. Moreover, a mixed-member electoral system as well as a tighter race between the two biggest parties is related to more, a larger number of parties in parliament to less minor interpellations.
机译：在本文中，我们提出了一个框架，可将立法者的身份纳入议会监督的政治经济学分析中。立法者根据他们的个人控制成本和选举竞争水平来决定他们在监督活动中的投入。我们关注的是当选为议会的公务员，他们面对利益冲突，但由于他们的经验和信息优势，他们的控制成本也较低。如果追究责任，监督就成为他们赢得选票的相对有吸引力的活动。对于德国人来说，我们发现议会中公务员的比例与提交的议会书记数呈正相关。当用其制度决定因素来衡量议会中公务员的比例时，这一结果成立。此外，成员混合的选举制度以及两个最大政党之间更紧密的种族关系与更多，更多的议会政党和较少的纠缠有关。

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