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The expert problem: a survey

机译：专家问题：调查

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摘要

The survey is focused on the typical problems in information transmission from experts to non-experts. Attention is paid to the factors that can affect information disclosure in models that apply a game-theoretic approach to the use of professional advice. In the economic literature expertise is mainly analyzed as a special case of asymmetric information between expert and non-expert. The contributions are reviewed according to a double criterion, that takes into account both the preferences of the experts and the properties of communication. On one side, either the non-expert plays the role of a decision-maker, who chooses an action that is payoff-relevant for the expert, or the preferences of the expert directly depend on some measure of his reputation as a high-ability forecaster. On the other side, communication can range from pure cheap talk to completely verifiable messages.
机译：该调查的重点是从专家到非专家的信息传输中的典型问题。在将博弈论方法应用于专业建议的模型中，应注意可能影响信息披露的因素。在经济文献中，专业知识主要被分析为专家与非专家之间信息不对称的特例。根据双重标准对稿件进行审查，该标准考虑了专家的偏爱和交流的性质。一方面，非专家扮演决策者的角色，他选择了与专家相关的行动，或者专家的偏好直接取决于其高能力声誉的某种衡量标准预报员。另一方面，交流的范围可以从纯粹的廉价交谈到完全可验证的消息。

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