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Bank runs as a coordination problem within a two-bank set-up: Who will survive?

机译:在两银行体系中,银行是一个协调问题:谁能生存?

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摘要

We experimentally test a new extension of the Diamond and Dybvig model with two banks where, in addition to keeping and withdrawing, depositors of the first bank can relocate their deposits to the second bank at no cost. In contrast to the second bank, the first bank experiences more panics, although the number of simultaneous bank runs decreases. We highlight the importance of studying bank runs as a system-related phenomenon where depositors can change their initial deposit allocation. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:我们用两个银行实验性地测试了Diamond和Dybvig模型的新扩展,其中除了保留和取款外,第一家银行的存款人还可以免费将其存款转移到第二家银行。与第二银行相反,第一银行遇到更多的恐慌,尽管同时运行的银行数量有所减少。我们强调研究银行挤兑是一种与系统相关的现象,在此现象中,存款人可以更改其初始存款分配。 (C)2019 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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