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In trying to explain just how the European Union managed to fail to respond in an orderly and efficient manner to the recent financial crisis, you relied on a classic but ultimately soft explanation: it "had less to do with institutional architecture than with political will" ("The European Union's week from hell", Octobernth). To be sure, political will, or better the lack thereof, is playing a part in Europe's present economic and financial turmoil, but only of a second order. The European predicament is much more serious than that.rnAs all financial hell breaks loose and recession looms large, the eu is stuck with tax-competition policies, a slow-motion monetary regime and holier-than-thou fiscal-policy rules. As the economists James Buchanan and Geoffrey Bren-nan once put it, good games depend on good rules more than they depend on good players. The same, it must be said, goes for bad games.
机译:在试图解释欧盟如何无法有序,有效地应对最近的金融危机时,您所依据的是经典但最终是软性的解释:“与制度架构无关,而与政治意愿无关” (“欧盟地狱周”,十月号)。可以肯定的是,政治意愿,或者更好地是缺乏政治意愿,在欧洲目前的经济和金融动荡中发挥了作用,但只是次要的。欧洲的困境要比这严重得多。随着所有金融危机的破裂和衰退的迫在眉睫,欧盟一直坚持税收竞争政策,宽松的货币制度和比以往更神圣的财政政策规则。正如经济学家詹姆斯·布坎南(James Buchanan)和杰弗里·布伦·南(Geoffrey Bren-nan)曾经说过的那样,好的游戏对好的规则的依赖比对好的球员的依赖更大。必须说,糟糕的游戏也是如此。

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    《The economist》 |2008年第8603期|20-22|共3页
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