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首页> 外文期刊>Energy Policy >Setting up charging electric stations within residential communities in current China: Gaming of government agencies and property management companies
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Setting up charging electric stations within residential communities in current China: Gaming of government agencies and property management companies

机译：在当前中国的居民社区内建立充电站：政府机构和物业管理公司的博弈

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摘要

The difficulty of charging electric vehicles (EVs) is now hindering their further development. Governments generally choose to build stations for home charging (including piles) within residential communities. Given the conflict of interest between various government agencies and property management companies, constructing a charging station within residential communities would result in welfare loss for the property management companies and therefore lead to the principal-agent problem. This paper constructs a two-period imperfect information game theory model to study the moral hazard involved in this issue and government agencies' optimal choice. In the analytic solution of the model, we find that the optimal choice for a farsighted government agency is to constantly improve the incentive mechanism and introduce charging stations only when the conflict of interest is eliminated. Any benefits derived from government regulations by force would prove short-lived. The government should focus on long-term returns in the development of EVs, and its optimal mechanism should be designed to mitigate the principal-agent problem of property management companies, thereby accelerate the progress of EV charging infrastructure and improve overall social welfare.
机译：电动汽车（EV）的充电难度目前阻碍了其进一步发展。政府通常会选择在居民社区内建立充电站（包括桩）。鉴于各种政府机构与物业管理公司之间的利益冲突，在居民社区内建立充电站将导致物业管理公司的福利损失，从而导致委托代理问题。本文构建了一个两阶段不完善的信息博弈理论模型，研究了此问题涉及的道德风险和政府机构的最佳选择。在模型的解析解中，我们发现，有远见的政府机构的最佳选择是不断完善激励机制，并且只有在消除利益冲突时才引入收费站。强制性政府法规带来的任何好处都将是短暂的。政府应着眼于电动汽车发展的长期回报，并应设计其最佳机制来减轻物业管理公司的委托代理问题，从而加速电动汽车充电基础设施的发展并改善整体社会福利。

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  • 来源
    《Energy Policy》 |2015年第2期|216-226|共11页
  • 作者

    Tian Wu; Lin Ma; Zhonggen Mao; Xunmin Ou;

  • 作者单位

    School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;

    School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;

    School of Business Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, China;

    Institute of Energy, Environment and Economy, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China,China Automotive Energy Research Center, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《工程索引》(EI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Electric vehicle; Electric charging station; Game theory model;

    机译：电动汽车;充电站;博弈论模型;

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