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首页> 外文期刊>Energy Policy >Auction approaches of long-term contracts to ensure generation investment in electricity markets: Lessons from the Brazilian and Chilean experiences
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Auction approaches of long-term contracts to ensure generation investment in electricity markets: Lessons from the Brazilian and Chilean experiences

机译：长期合同的拍卖方法，以确保电力市场中的发电投资：巴西和智利的经验教训

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摘要

The implementation of auctions of long-term electricity contracts is arising as an alternative to ensure generation investment and therefore achieve a reliable electricity supply. The aim is to reconcile generation adequacy with efficient energy purchase, correct risk allocation among investors and consumers, and the politico-economic environment of the country. In this paper, a generic proposal for a long-term electricity contracts approach is made, including practical design concepts for implementation. This proposal is empirically derived from the auctions implemented in Brazil and Chile during the last 6 years. The study is focused on practices and lessons which are especially useful for regulators and policy makers that want to facilitate the financing of new desirable power plants in risky environments and also efficiently allocate supply contracts among investors at competitive prices. Although this mechanism is generally seen as a significant improvement in market regulation, there are questions and concerns on auction performance that require careful design and which are identified in this paper. In addition, the experiences and proposal described can serve to derive further mechanisms in order to promote the entrance of particular generation technologies, e.g. renewables, in the developed world and therefore achieve a clean electricity supply.
机译：为了确保发电投资并因此获得可靠的电力供应，替代性地出现了长期电力合同的拍卖。目的是使发电充足与有效的能源购买，正确的投资者和消费者之间的风险分配以及国家的政治经济环境相协调。在本文中，提出了关于长期电力合同方法的通用建议，包括实施的实用设计概念。该建议是根据经验得出的，来自过去6年在巴西和智利进行的拍卖。该研究的重点是实践和课程，这对于希望在风险环境中促进新的理想发电厂的融资并希望以具有竞争力的价格在投资者之间有效分配供应合同的监管者和决策者特别有用。尽管这种机制通常被认为是市场监管方面的重大改进，但对拍卖表现仍存在一些疑问和疑虑，需要仔细设计并在本文中加以确定。另外，所描述的经验和建议可以用来推导进一步的机制，以促进特定的发电技术的进入，例如。发达国家的可再生能源，因此实现了清洁电力供应。

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  • 来源
    《Energy Policy》 |2010年第10期|p.5758-5769|共12页
  • 作者

    R. Moreno; L.A. Barroso; H. Rudnick; S. Mocarquer; B. Bezerra;

  • 作者单位

    Imperial College London, Electrical and Electronic Engineering Department, South Kensington Campus, UK;

    rnPSR, Praia de Botafogo 228/1701 parte, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil;

    rnPontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Electrical Engineering Department, Chile;

    rnSystep, Don Carlos 2939 oficina 1007, Santiago, Chile;

    rnPSR, Praia de Botafogo 228/1701 parte, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《工程索引》(EI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    long-term contract; auction design; generation investment;

    机译：长期合约;拍卖设计;发电投资;

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