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Price caps and investment: long-run effects in the electric generation industry

机译：价格上限和投资：发电行业的长期影响

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摘要

this paper utilizes a dynamic framework to determine the long-run effects of price caps on electricity generation investment and spot prices. The results show that the effects of spot market price caps differ significantly based upon the market structure. In a social welfare maximization scenario, price caps will not reduce average electricity prices and may actually raise them due to the dynamic affect of price caps on investment. In addition, price caps may reduce overall investment levels and result in welfare losses if the independent system operator is forced to shed load. Therefore, since social welfare maximization will approximate a competitive outcome, the results imply that price caps should be avoided in competitive markets.
机译：本文利用动态框架来确定价格上限对发电投资和现货价格的长期影响。结果表明，现货市场价格上限的影响因市场结构而有显着差异。在社会福利最大化的情况下，由于价格上限对投资的动态影响，价格上限不会降低平均电价，而实际上可能会提高平均电价。此外，如果独立系统运营商被迫减负，价格上限可能会降低总体投资水平并导致福利损失。因此，由于社会福利最大化将接近竞争结果，因此该结果暗示在竞争性市场中应避免价格上限。

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