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首页> 外文期刊>Environmental & Resource Economics >Emission Trading with Fiscal Externalities: The Case for a Common Carbon Tax for the Non-ETS Emissions in the EU
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Emission Trading with Fiscal Externalities: The Case for a Common Carbon Tax for the Non-ETS Emissions in the EU

机译：具有财政外部性的排放交易：欧盟非ETS排放共同碳税的案例

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摘要

A government is fiscally constrained if it is unable to raise sufficient tax revenue to finance the first-best level of public spending. When involved in emission trading, a fiscally constrained government will potentially seek to close its fiscal gap through emission permit sales. This fiscal incentive therefore generates a fiscal externality in the permit market that is endogenous to the extent of fiscal constrainedness among the participating countries. Our theory explains how, and when, fiscal externalities may be expected to arise. Moreover, we show that in a permit market equilibrium with fiscal externalities, the initial allocation of emission permits between countries will affect: (1) the price of emission permits, (2) the global distribution of abatement effort, and (3) total greenhouse gas mitigation costs. This is contrary to the textbook model of emission permit markets. Our findings are especially relevant for the EU which is about to allow for trading in emission rights between EU member countries for all emissions outside the European Emissions Trading System.
机译：如果政府无法筹集足够的税收来为公共支出的第一高水平筹集资金，就会受到财政限制。当参与排放交易时，受财政约束的政府将有可能通过出售排放许可证来缩小其财政缺口。因此，这种财政激励措施在许可证市场上产生了财政外部性，这种外部性是内生的，在参与国之间存在财政约束的程度。我们的理论解释了如何以及何时会出现财政外部性。此外，我们表明，在具有财政外部性的许可证市场均衡中，国家之间排放许可证的初始分配将影响：（1）排放许可证的价格；（2）减排努力的全球分布；（3）温室气体总量气体减排成本。这与排放许可证市场的教科书模型相反。我们的发现对欧盟尤为重要，因为欧盟即将允许在欧盟成员国之间就欧洲排放权交易体系之外的所有排放权进行排放权交易。

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