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Investigating Potential Impacts of Credit Failure Risk Mitigation on Habitat Exchange Outcomes

机译：调查降低信贷失败风险对栖息地交换结果的潜在影响

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Voluntary, market-based conservation programs are one tool available to land managers and regulators to maintain and enhance environmental resources. One such program type is a habitat exchange, through which a private landowner sells conservation to developers to offset a disturbance on the landscape. Since landowner participation is voluntary, price and contract terms must be sufficiently appealing to induce participation. Moreover, landowners who undertake costly actions to generate sellable credits face risk of failure. In particular, stipulated habitat improvements may fail to be achieved in the future due to events outside the control of landowners, resulting in foregone conservation payments. In the absence of sufficient real-world data for conventional econometric analysis, we implement a laboratory market experiment to assess the impact of market structure, credit failure risk, and a potential reimbursement policy on habitat exchange outcomes (market price, quantity traded, earnings, and efficiency). Findings suggest that failure risk significantly reduces habitat credit production and trade in this market environment, putting the potential success of such emerging markets in question. A private party risk mitigation strategy of buyers reimbursing sellers for production costs on failed units could mitigate these impacts. Specifically, reimbursing sellers for production costs on credits that fail to maintain habitat quality for their contract life can significantly mitigate reductions in conservation production resulting from this risk.
机译：自愿的，基于市场的保护计划是土地管理者和监管者可用来维护和增强环境资源的一种工具。一种这样的计划类型是栖息地交换，私人土地所有者通过该交易将保护区出售给开发商，以抵消对景观的干扰。由于土地所有者的参与是自愿的，因此价格和合同条款必须具有足够的吸引力才能吸引参与。此外，采取代价高昂的行动以产生可出售信用额的土地所有者面临失败的风险。特别是，由于土地所有者无法控制的事件，将来可能无法实现规定的栖息地改善，从而放弃了保护费用。在没有足够的实际数据进行常规计量经济学分析的情况下，我们将进行实验室市场实验，以评估市场结构，信用失败风险以及潜在的补偿政策对栖息地交换结果（市场价格，交易量，收益，和效率）。研究结果表明，在这种市场环境中，失败风险极大地减少了生境信贷的生产和贸易，使此类新兴市场的潜在成功成为问题。买方降低买方风险的策略是，向卖方赔偿发生故障的产品的生产成本，可以减轻这些影响。具体而言，用无法在合同期内维持栖息地质量的信用额度向卖方补偿生产成本，可以大大减轻由于这种风险而导致的保护性生产减少。

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