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Investigating Potential Impacts of Credit Failure Risk Mitigation on Habitat Exchange Outcomes

机译：调查信用失败风险减灾对栖息地交换成果的潜在影响

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摘要

Voluntary, market-based conservation programs are one tool available to land managers and regulators to maintain and enhance environmental resources. One such program type is a habitat exchange, through which a private landowner sells conservation to developers to offset a disturbance on the landscape. Since landowner participation is voluntary, price and contract terms must be sufficiently appealing to induce participation. Moreover, landowners who undertake costly actions to generate sellable credits face risk of failure. In particular, stipulated habitat improvements may fail to be achieved in the future due to events outside the control of landowners, resulting in foregone conservation payments. In the absence of sufficient real-world data for conventional econometric analysis, we implement a laboratory market experiment to assess the impact of market structure, credit failure risk, and a potential reimbursement policy on habitat exchange outcomes (market price, quantity traded, earnings, and efficiency). Findings suggest that failure risk significantly reduces habitat credit production and trade in this market environment, putting the potential success of such emerging markets in question. A private party risk mitigation strategy of buyers reimbursing sellers for production costs on failed units could mitigate these impacts. Specifically, reimbursing sellers for production costs on credits that fail to maintain habitat quality for their contract life can significantly mitigate reductions in conservation production resulting from this risk.
机译：自愿，基于市场的节约计划是土地管理人员和监管机构提供的一种工具，以维持和提高环境资源。一个这样的程序类型是栖息地交换，私人土地所有者通过哪个私人土地所有者向开发商销售保护，以抵消对景观的干扰。由于土地所有者参与是自愿的，但价格和合同条款必须充分吸引参与。此外，土地所有者承接昂贵的行动，以产生畅销信贷面临失败的风险。特别是，由于土地所有者控制范围之外的事件，将来可能无法实现规定的栖息地改善，导致保存支付。在没有足够的现实世界数据的传统经济学分析的情况下，我们实施实验室市场实验，以评估市场结构，信贷失败风险和潜在的报销政策对栖息地交换成果的影响（市场价格，数量交易，收益，收益和效率）。调查结果表明，失败风险大大降低了该市场环境中的栖息地信贷生产和贸易，这会提出这些新兴市场的潜在成功。买家偿还卖方在失败的单位上用于生产成本的私人派对风险缓解策略可以减轻这些影响。具体而言，偿还卖方在未能维持其合同生活中未能维持栖息地质量的信贷的生产成本可以显着减轻这种风险导致保护生产的减少。

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