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首页> 外文期刊>Environmental & Resource Economics >The Role of Budgetary Information in the Preference for Externality-Correcting Subsidies over Taxes: A Lab Experiment on Public Support
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The Role of Budgetary Information in the Preference for Externality-Correcting Subsidies over Taxes: A Lab Experiment on Public Support

机译：预算信息在偏向外部性税收补贴中的作用：公共支持的实验室实验

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摘要

The potential of taxes to correct environmental externalities has long been recognized among economists. Yet, this welfare-enhancing policy commonly faces strong opposition by citizens. Conversely, externality-correcting subsidies frequently enjoy high public support. We conduct a lab experiment to explore public support for Pigouvian taxes and subsidies. In an experimental market with a negative externality, participants vote on the introduction of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies under full or reduced information concerning how the tax revenues will be spent and the subsidy paid for. Theoretically the two instruments should produce identical outcomes. However, we find substantially greater support for subsidies than for taxes. This can partially be explained by the participants' expectation that the subsidy will increase their own payoffs more than a tax, but not because it is expected to be more effective in changing behavior. Furthermore, we find that with greater uncertainty, the preference for subsidies is even stronger, a result which is consistent with loss aversion.
机译：长期以来，经济学家已经认识到纠正环境外部性的税收潜力。但是，这种提高福利的政策通常面临公民的强烈反对。相反，纠正外部性的补贴经常得到公众的大力支持。我们进行了一项实验室实验，以探索公众对庇古的税收和补贴的支持。在外部外部为负的实验市场中，参与者会在关于税收收入将如何使用和补贴支付的全部或减少信息的基础上，对引入庇古税和补贴进行投票。从理论上讲，这两种工具应产生相同的结果。但是，我们发现对补贴的支持要比对税收的支持大得多。参与者的期望可以部分解释这一点，即补贴将增加自己的收益而不是税收，但这不是因为期望补贴在改变行为方面更有效。此外，我们发现，随着不确定性的增加，对补贴的偏好更加强烈，这一结果与损失规避相吻合。

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