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首页> 外文期刊>Environmental & Resource Economics >Voting for Burden Sharing Rules in Public Goods Games
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Voting for Burden Sharing Rules in Public Goods Games

机译：投票支持公共物品游戏中的负担分担规则

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摘要

We experimentally investigate whether groups of heterogeneous agents can reach an agreement on how to share the costs of providing a public good. Thereby, we explore the performance of different burden sharing rules being implemented either endogenously or exogenously. In case of an endogenously implemented burden sharing rule, subjects vote for different burden sharing schemes either by unanimity or majority vote. Despite the fact that preferences for the allocation schemes differ among agents, most groups agree upon a common scheme, and consequently avoid an uncoordinated action. Our results reveal both the opportunities and risks of burden sharing negotiations. We find average efficiency levels to increase in case an agreement is reached. If groups however fail to agree upon a common rule, cooperation collapses and efficiency levels decrease compared to a voluntary contribution mechanism being exogenously imposed. Most importantly, agents who face a voting decision on average receive higher payoffs than agents in an exogenously implemented voluntary contribution mechanism and do not earn less than participants in any externally determined burden sharing rule.
机译：我们通过实验研究了不同种类的代理是否可以就如何分担提供公共物品的成本达成协议。因此，我们探索了不同的负担分担规则的性能，这些规则是内生的还是外生的。如果是内生执行的负担分担规则，则主体可以通过一致投票或多数表决来投票支持不同的负担分担方案。尽管代理商之间对分配方案的偏好有所不同，但大多数团体都同意一个共同的方案，因此避免了不协调的行动。我们的结果揭示了负担分担谈判的机会和风险。如果达成协议，我们发现平均效率水平会提高。但是，如果各团体未能就一条共同规则达成共识，则与外来施加的自愿捐款机制相比，合作将崩溃，效率水平将下降。最重要的是，平均面临投票决定的代理商所获得的收益要高于外源实施的自愿捐款机制中的代理商，并且其收益不会低于任何外部确定的负担分担规则的参与者。

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