...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Environmental & Resource Economics >Environmental Policy in a Federation with Special Interest Politics and Inter-Governmental Grants
【24h】

Environmental Policy in a Federation with Special Interest Politics and Inter-Governmental Grants

机译：具有特殊利益政治和政府间拨款的联盟中的环境政策

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

The paper explores the potential effect of intergovernmental grants (IGG) on sub-national (local) environmental policy in a federal structure. In the model, a politically-inclined local government receives campaign contributions from the polluters' lobby in return for lower pollution taxes. A benevolent federal government uses IGG as an incentive to reduce the resulting distortion in the local pollution tax. IGG are formulaic transfers that are conditional on pollution levels-lower pollution in a sub-national jurisdiction relative to others translates into a higher share of the grant and vice versa. In equilibrium, the grant effect reduces the distortion created in the pollution tax by the lobby effect, and may even lead to a higher than Pigouvian tax when the local government assigns a large enough weight on social welfare and/or when the grant is large enough. Further, IGG result in the tax levels of jurisdictions becoming interdependent in an interesting way. Environmental policies in two jurisdictions may become strategic complements or substitutes depending on their relative pollution levels. The possibility of strategic substitution implies that federal welfare may not increase even when environmental policy becomes stricter in one state.
机译：本文探讨了联邦政府结构中政府间赠款（IGG）对地方（地方）环境政策的潜在影响。在该模型中，有政治倾向的地方政府会从污染者的游说团体获得竞选捐款，以换取较低的污染税。仁慈的联邦政府将IGG用作激励措施，以减少由此产生的当地污染税扭曲。 IGG是一种有条理的转移支付，以污染水平为条件-相对于其他国家/地区而言，次国家级司法管辖区的污染水平较低，转化为拨款中的较高份额，反之亦然。在均衡状态下，补助效应减少了游说效应在污染税中造成的扭曲，当地方政府对社会福利给予足够大的重视和/或补助足够大时，甚至可能导致比庇古税更高的补贴。 。此外，IGG导致辖区的税收水平以一种有趣的方式相互依存。两个辖区的环境政策可能会根据其相对污染水平而成为战略补充或替代。战略替代的可能性意味着，即使一个州的环境政策变得更加严格，联邦福利也可能不会增加。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号