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Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements

机译：讨价还价和国际环境协定

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摘要

This article surveys game theoretic papers focused on the negotiation process that leads to an International Environmental Agreement. Most of the papers considered apply bargaining theory, although other approaches have been considered as well. Among other issues, the papers considered analyze: the burden sharing rule that will result from a negotiation over a global public good; the role of information asymmetries; the impact of unilateral commitments, delegation, and ratification; whether or not countries are going to form groups during the negotiation process; and the influence of the expectation of a future bargaining process on investment decisions. The basic bargaining model is optimistic, as it predicts that countries will reach an efficient agreement immediately. However, all the developments of this model surveyed afterwards are rather pessimistic and even the basic model has perverse incentives for pre-negotiation signals.
机译：本文对博弈论论文进行了调查，其重点是导致达成《国际环境协议》的谈判过程。尽管还考虑了其​​他方法，但大多数被认为适用于讨价还价理论的论文。所审议的论文除其他问题外，还分析了：就全球公共利益进行谈判而产生的负担分担规则；信息不对称的作用；单方面承诺，授权和批准的影响；各国在谈判过程中是否将组成小组；以及对未来讨价还价过程的期望对投资决策的影响。基本的谈判模型是乐观的，因为它预测各国将立即达成有效的协议。但是，此后调查的该模型的所有发展都相当悲观，甚至基本模型都对预协商信号产生了有害的激励作用。

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