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On the Provision of Public Goods with Probabilistic and Ambiguous Thresholds

机译：具有概率和歧义阈值的公共物品的提供

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摘要

Many natural systems involve thresholds that, once triggered, imply irreversible damages for the users. Although the existence of such thresholds is undisputed, their location is highly uncertain. We explore experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects collective action in a series of threshold public goods games. Whereas the public good is always provided when the exact value of the threshold is known, threshold uncertainty is generally detrimental for the public good provision as contributions become more erratic. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty is particularly severe when it takes the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players are not only unaware of the value of the threshold, but also of its probability distribution. Early and credible commitment helps groups to cope with uncertainty.
机译：许多自然系统都涉及阈值，一旦触发这些阈值，便会对用户造成不可挽回的损害。尽管这些阈值的存在是无可争辩的，但是它们的位置是高度不确定的。我们通过实验探索阈值不确定性如何影响一系列阈值公共物品博弈中的集体行动。尽管在知道阈值的确切值时总是提供公共物品，但是随着捐款变得更加不稳定，阈值不确定性通常不利于公共物品的提供。当阈值不确定性采取模棱两可的形式时，即当玩家不仅不知道阈值的值，而且不知道其概率分布时，其负面影响尤其严重。尽早而可信的承诺有助于团体应对不确定性。

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