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首页> 外文期刊>Environmental & Resource Economics >Buyer Liability and Voluntary Inspections in International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: A Laboratory Study
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Buyer Liability and Voluntary Inspections in International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: A Laboratory Study

机译：国际温室气体排放交易中的买方责任和自愿检查：一项实验室研究

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摘要

This paper reports a preliminary laboratory experiment in which traders make investments to increase the reliability of tradable instruments that represent greenhouse gas emissions allowances. In one half of the sessions these investments are unobservable, while in the other half traders can invite costless and accurate inspections that make reliability investments public. We implement a buyer liability rule, so that if emissions reductions are unreliable (i.e., sellers default), the buyer of the allowances cannot redeem them to cover emissions. We find that allowing inspections significantly increases the reliability investment rate and overall efficiency. Prices of uninspected allowances usually trade at a substantial discount due to the buyer liability rule, which provides a strong market incentive for sellers to invest in reliability.
机译：本文报告了一项初步的实验室实验，交易者在其中进行了投资以提高代表温室气体排放配额的可交易工具的可靠性。在一半的会议中，这些投资是不可观察的，而在另一半的交易中，交易者可以邀请进行无成本且准确的检查，以公开进行可靠性投资。我们实施了买方责任规则，这样，如果减排量不可靠（即卖方违约），则配额的购买者无法将其赎回以涵盖排放量。我们发现允许检查可以显着提高可靠性投资率和总体效率。由于买方责任规则，未检验配额的价格通常会以大幅折价交易，这为卖方投资于可靠性提供了强大的市场动力。

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