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PRIVATE (UTILITY) REGULATORS

机译：私人（公用事业）监管机构

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摘要

The concept of the regulatory compact has long underpinned regulation of electric utilities: In exchange for a government-conferred monopoly over electricity services, the utility company submits itself to substantial government oversight, which-in theory at least-ought to prevent the emergence of monopolistic prices and other anticompetitive inefficiencies. Nevertheless, as this Article reveals, existing regulatory treatment of electric utilities fails to deliver on the public benefits of the regulatory compact. The Article supports this conclusion by highlighting previously overlooked indicators of utility companies' inefficiencies, and it attributes those inefficiencies to information asymmetries and regulatory capture. Having demonstrated problems with the existing regulatory compact, this Article then turns to potential solutions. In so doing, the Article draws from a seemingly unlikely source: private equity. Though superficially distinct, the "business" of private equity actually shares important functional similarities with the task of public utility regulation, as private equity managers, like public utility regulators, must "oversee" the businesses without altogether taking over management of the company itself. Given these shared challenges, public utility regulators would do well to utilize tools that have yielded success within the private-equity sphere. Specifically, the Article points to two such tools-zero-based planning ("ZBP") and complete transparency-that, it argues, will enable regulators, intervenors, and non-traditional market participants to innovate and ensure a more cost-effective energy transition. While this would be a radical departure from current regulatory proceedings, it is necessary if the regulatory compact is to survive in a water- and carbon-constrained world. Utilities, through their actions in rate cases, are entrenching their positions, requiring both more time and money for any transition to the new energy system to occur. Adoption of these changes, fostering innovation, and allowing a natural monopoly to exist only where explicitly necessary to meet grid and customer needs may be enough to ensure the regulatory compact works in the public interest going forward. "[T]his is a monopoly industry laden with perverse incentives to over-invest in capital on the part of the utility. I'm very skeptical of the type of corporate behavior that results from a cost-of-service regulatory monopoly." Travis Kavulla, President, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners1 "I think it's very clear that the reason we're not building the grid of the future that we've seen pictures of a million times is because we have a policy and regulatory structure that has the incentives to rebuild the old system as opposed to build the new system." Richard Kauffman, Chairman, Energy and Finance for New York, and Chairman of the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) 2.
机译：监管紧凑型的概念长期以来的电力公用事业管理：换取政府授予的电力服务授予电力服务，本效用公司将自己提出了大量政府监督，这至少是为了防止垄断的出现价格和其他反竞争低效率。尽管如此，正如本文所揭示的那样，现有的电力公用事业的监管治疗未能提供监管契约的公共利益。本文通过突出以前忽视的公用事业公司效率低下的指标来支持这一结论，并且它将这些效率低于信息不对称和监管捕获。在现有的监管紧凑型问题上表现出存在的问题，然后这篇文章转向潜在的解决方案。在这样做的过程中，文章从一个看似不太可能的来源：私募股权。虽然过着表面上截然不同，但私募股权的“商业”实际上与公用事业监管的任务有关，因为私募股权经理，如公共公用事业监管机构，必须“监督”业务，而无得完全接管公司本身的管理。鉴于这些共同的挑战，公用事业监管机构可以很好地利用在私募股权球体内取得成功的工具。具体而言，文章指出了两个这样的工具 - 基于零的规划（“ZBP”）并完成透明度 - 它争辩说，将使监管机构，干预和非传统市场参与者创新和确保更具成本效益的能源过渡。虽然这将是从当前监管程序的激进偏离，但如果监管紧凑型在水和碳限制的世界中生存是必要的。公用事业，通过他们的行动案件，正在巩固他们的立场，要求更多的时间和金钱用于对新能源系统的过渡。采用这些变革，促进创新，允许自然垄断只有在明确达到电网和客户需求的情况下只能存在足以确保监管紧凑型在公共利益上发展。 “[T]他是一个垄断行业，持有邪恶的激励措施，在该效用中过度投资资本。我对来自服务成本监管垄断的企业行为类型非常持怀疑态度。”国家监管效用专员1“我认为非常清楚的是，我们没有建立未来网格的原因，我们看到了一百万次的照片是因为我们有一个政策和监管结构有权重建旧系统的激励措施，而不是建立新系统。“ Richard Kauffman，纽约董事长，能源和金融，以及纽约国家能源研究和发展管理局（NYSERDA）2。

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  • 来源
    《Environmental law》 |2020年第4期|999-1053|共55页
  • 作者

    HEATHER PAYNE;

  • 作者单位

    Seton Hall University School of Law;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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