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首页> 外文期刊>European Business Organization Law Review >Corporate Governance of Chinese State-controlled Listed Companies: A Revisit Through the Lens of Venture Capital
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Corporate Governance of Chinese State-controlled Listed Companies: A Revisit Through the Lens of Venture Capital

机译：中国国有控股上市公司的公司治理：风险投资视角的重新审视

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摘要

In China, state-controlled listed companies (SCLCs) refer to a type of Chinese domestically listed companies half of whose voting shares are held by Chinese governments or their wholly owned companies, or the resolutions of whose shareholder meetings can be substantially influenced by Chinese governments or their wholly owned companies despite the fact that the voting shares held by them account for less than half of all the outstanding voting shares issued by these listed companies. For example, they are able to have non-negligible impacts on the motions of shareholder meetings by holding only one third of the voting shares whereas two thirds supermajority voting is always required. The existing literature primarily scrutinises the corporate governance of SCLCs through the perspective of agency costs. Little attention is paid to its adaptive efficiency through the lens of venture capital. This article attempts to fill this gap on the basis of evidence from the incentive mechanisms in the operation of Chinese domestic venture capital, as compared to American venture capital experience. The template of American venture capital contains five incentive mechanisms useful for China: limited partnerships, staged financing, board representation, convertible preferred stock and stock options. Unfortunately, partly due to the institutional barriers imposed by the control-based model of SCLCs, these five mechanisms are still underdeveloped in Chinese domestic venture capital. The study shows that adaptive efficiency and agency costs are equally important factors which ought to be considered when proposing reforms of the corporate governance of SCLCs. Neglecting either of them would jeopardise the overall efficiency of the economy.
机译：在中国，国有控股上市公司（SCLC）是指中国境内上市公司的一种，其一半的投票权由中国政府或其全资公司持有，或者其股东大会的决议可能受到中国政府的重大影响或它们的全资公司，尽管它们持有的有表决权的股份不到这些上市公司发行的所有已发行有表决权的股份的一半以下。例如，通过仅持有三分之一的有表决权的股份，他们就可以对股东大会的议案产生不可忽略的影响，而始终需要三分之二的多数票。现有文献主要通过代理成本的角度详细审查了SCLC的公司治理。通过风险投资的镜头，它的适应效率很少受到关注。与美国的风险投资经验相比，本文试图基于中国国内风险投资运作中的激励机制的证据来弥补这一差距。美国风险投资的模板包含对中国有用的五种激励机制：有限合伙制，分阶段融资，董事会代表，可转换优先股和股票期权。不幸的是，部分原因是基于SCLC的基于控制的模型强加了制度性障碍，这五种机制在中国国内风险投资中仍然不发达。研究表明，适应性效率和代理成本是提议SCLCs公司治理改革时应考虑的重要因素。忽视其中任何一个都会危及经济的整体效率。

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