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Corporate Restructuring

机译:公司重组

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摘要

We survey the empirical literature on corporate financial restructuring, including breakup transactions (divestitures, spinoffs, equity carveouts, tracking stocks), leveraged recapitalizations, and leveraged buyouts (LBOs). For each transaction type, we survey techniques, deal financing, transaction volume, valuation effects and potential sources of restructuring gains. Many breakup transactions appear to be a response to excessive conglomeration and attempt to reverse a potentially costly diversification discount. The empirical evidence shows that the typical restructuring creates substantial value for shareholders. The value-drivers include elimination of costly cross-subsidizations characterizing internal capital markets, reduction in financing costs for subsidiaries through asset securitization and increased divisional transparency, improved (and more focused) investment programs, reduction in agency costs of free cash flow, implementation of executive compensation schemes with greater pay-performance sensitivity, and increased monitoring by lenders and LBO sponsors. Buyouts after the 1990s on average create value similar to LBOs of the 1980s. Recent developments include consortiums of private equity funds (club deals), exits through secondary buyouts (sale to another LBO fund), and evidence of persistence in fund returns. LBO deal financing has evolved toward lower leverage ratios. In Europe, recent deals are financed with less leveraged loans and mezzanine debt and more high-yield debt than before. Future research challenges include integrating analyses across transaction types and financing mixes, and producing unbiased estimates of the expected return from buyout investments in the presence of limited data on portfolio companies that do not return to public status.
机译:我们调查了有关公司财务重组的经验文献,包括分拆交易(资产剥离,分拆,股权分拆,追踪股票),杠杆资本重组和杠杆收购(LBO)。对于每种交易类型,我们都会调查技术,交易融资,交易量,估值影响以及重组收益的潜在来源。许多分拆交易似乎是对过度集团化的一种回应,并试图扭转可能代价高昂的多元化折扣。经验证据表明,典型的重组为股东创造了可观的价值。价值驱动因素包括消除以内部资本市场为特征的昂贵的交叉补贴,通过资产证券化和提高部门透明度来降低子公司的融资成本,改善(并更加专注)投资计划,减少自由现金流的代理费用,实施具有更高薪酬绩效敏感性的高管薪酬计划,以及放款人和杠杆收购发起人的监督力度加大。 1990年代以后的收购平均创造的价值类似于1980年代的杠杆收购。最近的事态发展包括私募股权基金财团(俱乐部交易),通过二次收购退出(出售给另一家杠杆收购基金)以及基金回报率持续存在的证据。杠杆收购交易融资已朝着更低的杠杆比率发展。在欧洲,最近的交易以比以前更少的杠杆贷款和夹层债务以及更多的高收益债务来融资。未来的研究挑战包括整合对交易类型和融资组合的分析,以及在没有返回公众状态的投资组合公司数据有限的情况下,对收购投资的预期回报进行无偏估计。

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  • 来源
    《Foundations and trends in finance》 |2012年第3期|1-911-4547-5153-105107-132A1-A2|共130页
  • 作者单位

    Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Hanover, NH 03755, USA;

    Norwegian School of Economics, Helleveien 30, 5045 Bergen, Norway;

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