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Investor Protections and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in the Netherlands

机译：投资者保护和集中所有权：评估荷兰的公司控制机制

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摘要

The Berk-Means problem ― information and incentive asymmetries disrupting relations between knowledgeable managers and remote investors ― has remained a durable issue engaging researchers since the 1930s. However, the Eerie-Means paradigm ― widely dispersed, helpless investors facing strong, entrenched managers ― is under stress in the wake of the cross-country evidence presented by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, and their legal approach to corporate control. This paper continues to investigate the roles of investor protections and concentrated ownership by examining firm behaviour in the Netherlands. Our within-country analysis generates two key results. First, the role of investor protections emphasized in the legal approach is not sustained. Rather, firm performance is enhanced when the firm is freed of equity market constraints. Second, ownership concentration does not have a discernible impact on firm performance, which may reflect large shareholders' dual role in lowering the costs of managerial agency problems but raising the agency costs of expropriation.
机译：自1930年代以来，Berk-Means问题（即信息和激励不对称性破坏了知识渊博的管理者与远程投资者之间的关系）一直是吸引研究人员的持久问题。但是，由于La Porta，Lopez-de-Silanes，Sleifer和Vishny提出的越野证据及其法律手段，Eerie-Means范式-广泛分散，无助的投资者面对强大而根深蒂固的经理人-受到压力公司控制。本文通过研究荷兰的公司行为，继续研究投资者保护和集中所有权的作用。我们的国家内部分析产生两个关键结果。首先，在法律方法中强调的投资者保护作用并没有持续。相反，当公司摆脱股票市场的限制时，公司的业绩就会提高。其次，股权集中度对公司绩效没有明显影响，这可能反映了大股东在降低管理代理问题成本但增加了被征收代理成本方面的双重作用。

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