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The Enemy Within? Green Industrial Policy and Stranded Assets in China’s Power Sector

机译:敌人内部? 中国电力部门的绿色产业政策和滞留资产

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摘要

This article examines potential interest group opposition to green industrial policies through the lens of state investment in China's coal power sector. Using a novel data set on financial investments in Chinese coal power plants, we show that state actors have controlling stakes in the majority of nominally private coal plants. Importantly, the majority of such plants have investments from multiple levels of government. Green industrial policies could therefore face resistance from economic coalitions within the state, as state-owned coal plants and government agencies object to policies that harm their financial interests. Theoretically, this implies the need for a conceptualization of state capacity that allows for the ability to overcome internal opposition. Empirically, we highlight a predicament for the Chinese state: it has set ambitious goals to decarbonize but also has a vested interest in ensuring the profitability of the world's largest coal-fired power generation fleet.
机译:本文通过中国煤炭电力部门的国家投资镜头审查了潜在的利益小组反对绿色产业政策。 在中国煤炭发电厂的金融投资上使用新型数据,我们展示了国家演员在大多数名义上私有煤炭厂控制股权。 重要的是,大多数此类植物都有多层政府的投资。 因此,绿色产业政策可能面临州内的经济联盟的抵抗,作为国有煤炭厂和政府机构对危害其经济利益的政策。 从理论上讲,这意味着需要对允许克服内部反对的能力的状态容量的概念化。 凭经验,我们突出了中国国家的困境:它使脱碳的雄心勃勃的目标落成了脱碳,而且还对确保世界上最大的燃煤发电舰队的盈利能力具有既得利益。

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  • 来源
    《Global Environmental Politics》 |2021年第4期|88-109|共22页
  • 作者单位

    Johns Hopkins SAIS Energy Resources & Environm Washington DC 20036 USA;

    Johns Hopkins SAIS Energy Resources & Environm Washington DC 20036 USA;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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