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首页> 外文期刊>ICES Journal of Marine Science >Finding the accelerator and brake in an individual quota fishery: linking ecology, economics, and fleet dynamics of US West Coast trawl fisheries
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Finding the accelerator and brake in an individual quota fishery: linking ecology, economics, and fleet dynamics of US West Coast trawl fisheries

机译：在单个定额渔业中寻找加速器和制动器：将美国西海岸拖网渔业的生态，经济学和船队动态联系起来

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摘要

In 2011, the Pacific Fisheries Management Council implemented an individual transferrable quota (ITQ) system for the US West Coast groundfish trawl fleet. Under the ITQ system, each vessel now receives transferrable annual allocations of quota for 29 groundfish species, including target and bycatch species. Here we develop an ecosystem and fleet dynamics model to identify which components of an ITQ system are likely to drive responses in effort, target species catch, bycatch, and overall profitability. In the absence of penalties for discarding over-quota fish, ITQs lead to large increases in fishing effort and bycatch. The penalties fishermen expect for exceeding quota have the largest effect on fleet behaviour, capping effort and total bycatch. Quota prices for target or bycatch species have lesser impacts on fishing dynamics, even up to bycatch quota prices of $50 kg~(-1) Ports that overlap less with bycatch species can increase effort under individual quotas, while other ports decrease effort. Relative to a prior management system, ITQs with penalties for exceeding quotas lead to increased target species landings and lower bycatch, but with strong variation among species. The model illustrates how alternative fishery management policies affect profitability, sustainability and the ecosystem.
机译：2011年，太平洋渔业管理委员会为美国西海岸底层鱼类拖网船队实施了个人可转让配额（ITQ）系统。在ITQ系统下，每艘船现在都获得29种底层鱼类物种（包括目标和兼捕物种）的年度可转让配额分配。在这里，我们开发了一个生态系统和车队动力学模型，以识别ITQ系统的哪些组件可能推动工作响应，目标物种捕获，兼捕和总体获利能力。在没有丢弃超额配额鱼的处罚的情况下，ITQ导致捕捞努力和兼捕的大量增加。渔民期望超过配额的处罚对船队行为，封顶工作量和总兼捕量影响最大。目标或兼捕种类的配额价格对捕捞动态的影响较小，即使兼捕配额价格高达$ 50 kg〜（-1）与兼捕种类重叠较少的港口也可在个别配额下增加努力，而其他港口则减少努力。相对于先前的管理系统，对超过配额的处罚的ITQ导致目标物种的着陆增加和副渔获物减少，但物种间差异很大。该模型说明了替代渔业管理政策如何影响盈利能力，可持续性和生态系统。

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  • 来源
    《ICES Journal of Marine Science》 |2014年第2期|308-319|共12页
  • 作者

    Isaac C. Kaplan; Daniel S. Holland; Elizabeth A. Fulton;

  • 作者单位

    Conservation Biology Division, Northwest Fisheries Science Center, National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2725 Montlake Blvd E, Seattle WA 98112, USA;

    Conservation Biology Division, Northwest Fisheries Science Center, National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2725 Montlake Blvd E, Seattle WA 98112, USA;

    CSIRO Wealth from Oceans Flagship, Division of Marine and Atmospheric Research GPO Box 1538, Hobart TAS 7001, Australia;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    catch shares; ecosystem model; fleet dynamics; individual transferrable quotas; US West Coast;

    机译：抓股票生态系统模型;机队动力;个人可转让配额;美国西海岸;

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