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首页> 外文期刊>ICES Journal of Marine Science >Penalties And Rewards For Over- And Underages Of Catch Allocations
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Penalties And Rewards For Over- And Underages Of Catch Allocations

机译：渔获量分配过高和不足的处罚和奖励

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Many fisheries are managed using a total allowable catch (TAC) that is subsequently sub-allocated to different fisheries sectors. These allocations are then monitored separately to ensure the adherence of each fishery to its particular allocation quota and to the overall TAC. In some management arenas, there are systems of "payback" where over- and underages are punished or rewarded using particular decision rules. Differences between fishing gear, the sizes and ages of fish being targeted by those gears, and the spatio-temporal distribution of the fishers using those gears can lead to different precision, accuracy, and cost of monitoring the allocation, affecting the probability that an overall management objective is reached. Weaknesses in monitoring may be exploited by user groups in their competition for larger catches and, subsequently, bigger allocations, so differential monitoring precision and accuracy can lead to both short- and long-term reallocations, i.e. a new set of winners and losers. Simulations in a management strategy evaluation framework were used to demonstrate the implications of alternative decision rules regarding payback on conservation and sustainability objectives and rebuilding time frames. The efficacy of the rules under alternative monitoring systems was also examined. Decision rules allowing payback prolong rebuilding (compared with perfect implementation or more precautionary TACs), especially if monitoring is biased (catches misreported) or imprecise. When precision of reported catches was increased and/or bias decreased, better yields and stock abundance resulted. When overages were penalized and underages not rewarded, recovery was achieved earlier. Conversely, policies in which transgressions were ignored and underages rewarded did not perform well. Underreporting by one nation may result in stocks that are well below the stock size conservation standards, yet produce substantial gains in yield for that nation, unless other nations retaliate by underreporting.
机译：许多渔业使用允许的总捕捞量（TAC）进行管理，然后将其再分配给不同的渔业部门。然后分别监测这些分配，以确保每种渔业遵守其特定分配配额和总体TAC。在某些管理领域中，存在“回报”系统，其中使用特定的决策规则来惩罚或奖励未成年人和未成年人。渔具，这些渔具所针对的鱼的大小和年龄以及使用这些渔具的渔民的时空分布之间的差异可能导致监测分配的精度，准确性和成本不同，从而影响总体捕捞活动的可能性。达到管理目标。用户组可能会在竞争较大的捕获量和随后更大的分配量的竞争中利用监视方面的弱点，因此，不同的监视精度和准确性可能导致短期和长期的重新分配，即新的赢家和输家。使用管理策略评估框架中的模拟来论证关于投资回报对保护和可持续性目标以及重建时限的替代决策规则的含义。还检查了规则在替代监视系统下的有效性。决策规则允许投资回收期延长（与完美实施或更多预防性TAC相比），尤其是在监控有偏见（错误报告）或不精确的情况下。当报告的渔获物的精度提高和/或偏倚减少时，将产生更好的产量和种群数量。当超龄者受到惩罚而未成年者没有得到奖励时，恢复就更早了。相反，忽视过犯和奖励未成年者的政策效果不佳。一个国家的报告不足可能导致存量远低于保持种群规模的标准，但该国的产量却大为提高，除非其他国家通过报告不足进行报复。

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