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首页> 外文期刊>Information economics and policy >Pooling, a missing element in the rate of return and price cap regulation debate: A comparison of alternative regulatory regimes
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Pooling, a missing element in the rate of return and price cap regulation debate: A comparison of alternative regulatory regimes

机译：合并是回报率和价格上限监管辩论中缺失的要素：替代监管制度的比较

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In March 2010 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued the National Broadband Plan (NBP) detailing strategic proposals to increase broadband availability in the US. One of the sweeping suggestions of the NBP is to convert all incumbent local exchange carriers from rate-of-return (RoR) regulation to price cap regulation. Most of these RoR carriers are small Rural Local Exchange Carriers (RLECs) operating in sparsely populated, isolated territories of the US. Since AT&T's divestiture they have participated in revenue and cost sharing pools which have served as an effective mechanism for reducing unsystematic business risk. We stress that pooling makes both rate of return and price cap regulation operational in RLEC territories and has to be considered in the policy debates. Using cost and demand data from RLECs, we show that if FCC's suggestion was implemented under current price cap rules, many RLECs would likely face financial distress within 3 years of the regulatory regime change. We further show that allowing pooling arrangements under any regulatory regime could improve market efficiency. We suggest that potential efficiency gains are greatest when RLECs within a pooling arrangement have the option of remaining under RoR regulation or volunteering to move to a form of incentive regulation.
机译：2010年3月，美国联邦通信委员会（FCC）发布了国家宽带计划（NBP），其中详细介绍了提高美国宽带可用性的战略建议。 NBP的广泛建议之一是将所有现有的本地交换运营商从收益率（RoR）法规转换为价格上限法规。这些RoR运营商大多数是在美国人口稀少且孤立的地区运营的小型农村本地交换运营商（RLEC）。自从AT＆T撤资以来，他们参与了收入和成本分摊池，这是减少非系统性业务风险的有效机制。我们强调，集中化使回报率和价格上限监管在RLEC领土上都可操作，并且必须在政策辩论中予以考虑。使用来自RLEC的成本和需求数据，我们表明，如果FCC的建议是在当前的价格上限规则下实施的，那么许多RLEC可能会在监管制度变更后的3年内面临财务困境。我们进一步表明，允许在任何监管体制下进行集中安排都可以提高市场效率。我们建议，在集中化安排中的RLEC可以选择保留在RoR监管之下或自愿采取某种形式的激励监管的情况下，潜在的效率收益最大。

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