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Bargaining over Data: When Does Making the Buyer More Informed Help?

机译：关于数据的讨价还价：什么时候可以使购买者获得更多的知情帮助？

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摘要

The explosive growth of eBusiness has allowed many companies to accumulate a repertoire of unique data sets that can provide substantial value to other firms. These data sets are a growing source of revenue for their owners-one that can generate millions of dollars each year. Given its proprietary nature, the value of the data to a potential buyer is often uncertain to both parties. Therefore, a mutually acceptable price is usually arrived at through a process of negotiation. A seller can choose to provide a demonstration (demo; presentation) to mitigate this uncertainty and/or reduce bias. We adapt a generalization of Nash bargaining to identify when such demonstrations are appropriate and when they are not. We find that a moderately high-valued outside option can help the seller gain from a demonstration even when the buyer is not underestimating the value of the data. Demonstrations can also be useful when the buyer is biased and underestimates data set value. When both an outside option and underestimation exist, the provision of a demo that corrects for bias can make otherwise unsuccessful negotiations succeed; it also has the potential to trigger the provision of uncertainty-reducing information in the demo. In the presence of a demo cost, the seller can provide a partially informative demo; demos can also mitigate the effects of cannibalization up to a point.
机译：电子商务的爆炸性增长使许多公司积累了可为其他公司提供巨大价值的独特数据集。这些数据集为其所有者提供了越来越多的收入来源，每年可以产生数百万美元。鉴于其专有性，数据对潜在购买者的价值通常对于双方都不确定。因此，通常可以通过协商得出相互接受的价格。卖方可以选择提供演示（演示;演示）以减轻这种不确定性和/或减少偏差。我们采用纳什议价的一般化方法来确定何时合适这种示范，何时不合适。我们发现，即使买方没有低估数据价值，适度高价值的外部期权也可以帮助卖方从演示中受益。当购买者有偏见并低估数据集价值时，演示也可能会有用。如果同时存在外部选择和低估，则提供可以纠正偏见的演示可以使否则未成功的谈判成功;它还有可能触发演示中提供减少不确定性的信息。在存在演示费用的情况下，卖方可以提供部分内容丰富的演示;演示还可以最大程度地减轻自相残杀的影响。

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  • 来源
    《Information Systems Research》 |2020年第1期|1-15|共15页
  • 作者

  • 作者单位

    Calif State Univ East Bay Coll Business & Econ Dept Management Hayward CA 94542 USA;

    Univ Texas Dallas Dept Informat Syst Naveen Jindal Sch Management Richardson TX 75083 USA;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Nash bargaining; data monetization; demonstrations; outside option;

    机译：纳什讨价还价;数据货币化;示威;外部选择;

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