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Bank Capital Regulation and Soft Budget Constraints

机译：银行资本监管和软预算约束

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This paper presents a model of soft budget constraints on firms where refinancing of poor projects is ex post inefficient when viewed in isolation, and analyzes how bank capital regulation affects the softness of firms' budget constraints. A firm is said to have a soft budget constraint if a bank allows the firm to continue to operate even when continuation is ex post inefficient. It is shown that bank capital regulation may induce soft budget constraints on firms because banks have an incentive to roll over loans made to poor firms in order to comply with the regulation. It is also shown that soft budget constraints are more likely to arise when the regulation is less strict, that is, when banks' minimum required capital ratios are lower. This paper also demonstrates that soft budget constraints may be more likely to arise under Basel Ⅲ, that bank capital regulation may increase the probability of bank failures by inducing the soft budget constraint problem, and that the bank capital regulation of Basel Ⅰ was one of the causes of soft budget constraints in the post-bubble period of Japan.
机译：本文提出了一个针对软预算约束的公司模型，当孤立地看待劣质项目的融资后效率低下，并分析了银行资本监管如何影响公司预算约束的软性。如果一家银行允许该公司即使在事后效率低下的情况下仍能继续运营，则该公司将受到软预算约束。结果表明，银行资本监管可能会导致企业受到软预算约束，因为银行有动力将向贫困企业提供的贷款结转以遵守法规。研究还表明，当监管不严格时，即银行的最低要求资本比率较低时，更容易出现软预算约束。本文还表明，在巴塞尔协议Ⅲ下，软预算约束更有可能出现；银行资本监管可能通过引发软预算约束问题而增加银行倒闭的可能性；巴塞尔协议Ⅰ是其中的一项。后泡沫时期日本预算软约束的原因。

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