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首页> 外文期刊>International economic journal >'An Incomplete Contract Approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance'- Commitment vs. Flexibility
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'An Incomplete Contract Approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance'- Commitment vs. Flexibility

机译：“欧元区财政治理的不完全合同方法”-承诺与灵活性

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摘要

In this paper, we take an incomplete contract approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance between the European Commission (EC) and any heavily debt member state, Greece in particular. Incomplete contract approach makes possible to put a long process of Eurozone Fiscal Governance into an extensive form game in which a renegotiation procedure is incorporated. We theoretically reveal the conflict of interests between the EC (Germany) and Greece over the Greek debt repayment plan proposed in 2015. We show that the Greek's position is consistent with incomplete contract theory, but that the EC (Germany) does not allow the renegotiation for restructuring for growth-oriented debt repayment program proposed by the Greek government because the EC (Germany) judges that the commitment effect (on fiscal austerity) is greater than the flexibility one (pro-growth effect). This will undoubtedly provide a novel and interesting approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance.
机译：在本文中，我们对欧洲委员会（EC）与任何负债累累的成员国，特别是希腊之间的欧元区财政治理采取了不完全的合同方式。不完整的合同方式使得将长期的欧元区财政治理流程纳入广泛的形式博弈中成为可能，在博弈中纳入了重新谈判程序。我们从理论上揭示了欧共体（德国）与希腊之间在2015年提出的希腊债务偿还计划之间的利益冲突。我们表明希腊的立场与不完全合同理论相一致，但欧共体（德国）不允许重新谈判由于欧共体（德国）认为承诺效应（对财政紧缩）大于灵活性（亲增长效应），因此希腊政府提出了以增长为导向的债务偿还计划的重组方案。无疑，这将为欧元区财政治理提供一种新颖而有趣的方法。

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