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The Architecture and Governance of Financial Supervision: Sources and Implications

机译：金融监管的体系结构和治理：来源和启示

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摘要

We compare the architecture and governance of financial supervision across countries. We find that countries where the supervisor is the central bank, or where it is independent of government, have more conservatively regulated financial systems. Nonperforming loans are lower in countries where the supervisor is independent, while capital ratios are higher where the central bank, rather than another agency of government, is the lead supervisor. At the same time, some measures of bank credit to the economy are significantly lower both where the supervisor is independent and where the lead supervisor is the central bank. Insofar as the same institutional arrangements that confer greater stability, such as higher capital ratios and lower nonperforming loans, also limit the provision of credit to the economy, countries face a tradeoff. That different countries have been moving in different directions in restructuring their supervisory arrangements should not be surprising insofar as they have different objectives for their financial sector.
机译：我们比较了各国金融监管的架构和治理。我们发现，监管者为中央银行或独立于政府的国家对金融体系的监管更为保守。在主管独立的国家，不良贷款较低，而在中央银行而不是另一政府机构为主要主管的国家，资本比率较高。同时，在监管者是独立的和主要监管者是中央银行的情况下，银行对经济的信用度量明显降低。只要提供更高稳定性的相同机构安排（例如更高的资本比率和更低的不良贷款）也限制了对经济的信贷提供，各国将面临权衡。只要不同国家的金融部门目标不同，就已经朝着不同的方向重组其监管安排就不足为奇了。

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