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首页> 外文期刊>International game theory review >Infinite Horizon Dynamic Games: A New Approach via Information Updating
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Infinite Horizon Dynamic Games: A New Approach via Information Updating

机译：无限地平线动态游戏：通过信息更新的新方法

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摘要

This paper formulates a new approach to analyze infinite horizon dynamic games with uncertainties and unknowns in the players' future payoff structures. In many game situations, the game horizon would last for an indefinitely long period and one has to consider them as infinite horizon games. Existing infinite horizon dynamic games often rely on the assumption of time-invariant game structures for the derivation of equilibrium solutions. However, many events in the considerably far future are intrinsically unknown. In this paper, information about the players' future payoffs will be revealed as the game proceeds. Making use of the newly obtained information, the players revise their strategies accordingly, and the process will continue indefinitely. This new approach for the analysis of infinite horizon dynamic games via information updating provides a more realistic and practical alternative to the study of infinite horizon dynamic games.
机译：本文提出了一种新的方法来分析玩家未来收益结构中具有不确定性和未知数的无限地平线动态博弈。在许多游戏情况下，游戏视野将无限期持续，因此必须将其视为无限视野游戏。现有的无限地平线动态博弈通常依赖于时不变博弈结构的假设来推导均衡解。但是，在相当遥远的将来，许多事件本质上是未知的。在本文中，有关玩家未来收益的信息将随着游戏的进行而透露。玩家利用新获得的信息来相应地修改其策略，并且该过程将无限期地继续。这种通过信息更新来分析无限地平线动态博弈的新方法为研究无限地平线动态博弈提供了更为现实和实用的替代方法。

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  • 来源
    《International game theory review》 |2017年第4期|1750026.1-1750026.23|共23页
  • 作者

    David Yeung; Ovanes Petrosian;

  • 作者单位

    Center of Game Theory, St. Petersburg State University St. Petersburg 198504, Russia,SRS Consortium for Advanced Study in Cooperative Dynamic Games Hong Kong Shue Yan University, Hong Kong;

    Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Process St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg 198504, Russia,St. Petersburg School of Economics and Management National Research University Higher School of Economics Moscow 101000, Russia;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Dynamic games; infinite game horizon; information updating; uncertain payoff structures;

    机译：动态游戏;无限的游戏视野;信息更新;不确定的收益结构;

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