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STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF A BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT

机译：边境税收调整的战略效果

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摘要

Carbon leakage and competitiveness concerns are some of the main reasons why an international environmental agreement is lacking to fight climate change. Many studies discussed the adoption of a border tax adjustment (BTA) to allow countries that would like to implement a carbon tax to level the playing field with imports. The big drawback from these studies is that the other country is not allowed to react by adopting itself a carbon tax to avoid being punished with the BTA. The model proposed in this paper looks at the optimization of two different governments and their respective firms. Parametric values inside the set [0,1) are used to represent the possible extents of the BTA depending on both countries environmental policy allowing countries to have different carbon policies. The result that a BTA parameter of 0.5 yields the highest total welfare could increase its acceptance within the World Trade Organization (WTO).
机译：碳泄漏和竞争力问题是缺乏国际环境协议以应对气候变化的一些主要原因。许多研究讨论了采用边境税调整（BTA）的做法，以使希望实施碳税的国家能够与进口产品保持公平竞争。这些研究的最大缺点是，不允许另一个国家自己采取碳税来做出反应，以免受到BTA的惩罚。本文提出的模型着眼于两个不同政府及其各自公司的优化。集合[0,1）中的参数值用于表示BTA的可能程度，具体取决于两国的环境政策，从而允许各国制定不同的碳政策。 BTA参数0.5产生最高总福利的结果可能会增加其在世界贸易组织（WTO）中的接受度。

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