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首页> 外文期刊>International journal of business governance and ethics >Board of directors and bank performance: beyond agency theory
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Board of directors and bank performance: beyond agency theory

机译：董事会与银行绩效：超越代理理论

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摘要

By integrating agency, stewardship and resource-dependency perspectives, this paper associated three characteristics of the board of directors - outside directors, insiders' equity ownership and leadership duality (Executive Officer also being the Chairman of the Board) - with bank's financial performance in Lebanon. Using a panel model, and after controlling for endogeneity problems, we examined 54 listed and unlisted banks from 2005 to 2010. Our results implied that the presence of outside directors on the board and the leadership duality have no statistical impact on performance. It seems that severe regulations by the Lebanese monetary authority act as an external governance mechanism. On the contrary, insiders' ownership promotes convergence of the interests of managers/shareholders and shapes the performance of banks. Our findings may well urge Lebanese bankers and regulators towards further development and implementation of governance practices to enhance the performance and the stability of one of the pillars of the Lebanese economy.
机译：通过整合代理，管理和资源依赖的观点，本文将董事会的三个特征（外部董事，内部人的股权和领导双重性（执行官兼任董事长））与黎巴嫩银行的财务绩效相关联。使用面板模型，并在控制了内生性问题之后，我们研究了2005年至2010年间54家上市和未上市银行。我们的结果表明，董事会中存在外部董事和领导双重性对绩效没有统计学影响。黎巴嫩货币当局的严格规定似乎是一种外部治理机制。相反，内部人的所有权促进了经理/股东利益的融合，并影响了银行的绩效。我们的研究结果可能会敦促黎巴嫩银行家和监管机构进一步发展和实施治理实践，以提高黎巴嫩经济支柱之一的绩效和稳定性。

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