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首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Computational Economics and Econometrics >Limit your applications. Dealing with congested markets in the matching procedure
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Limit your applications. Dealing with congested markets in the matching procedure

机译：限制您的应用程序。在匹配过程中应对拥挤的市场

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摘要

We study congested matching markets, such as the PhD academic job market, and consider alternative mechanisms that could be implemented by a social planner. Building on the Gale and Shapley algorithm, we analyse (ⅰ) a procedure accounting for a limit in the number of applications PhD graduates can submit (PhD-LIMIT), and (ⅱ) a procedure accounting for a limit in the number of applications universities can evaluate (UNI-LIMIT). We find that the PhD-LIMIT procedure improves the matching outcome and is preferable to a UNI-LIMIT procedure. The optimal limit in the number of applications balances the trade-off between being unmatched and gaining a better match in the aggregate, and the benefit can be considerable if the graduates' preferences over the positions are not very correlated. Overall, we suggest a direction to improve the matching market for PhD candidates by improving the outcome of their matches and lowering the hiring costs for universities.
机译：我们研究了拥挤的匹配市场，例如博士学术工作市场，并考虑了社交计划者可以实施的替代机制。在Gale和Shapley算法的基础上，我们分析（ⅰ）限制博士毕业生可以提交的申请数量的程序（PhD-LIMIT），以及（ⅱ）限制大学申请数量的程序可以评估（UNI-LIMIT）。我们发现PhD-LIMIT程序可以改善匹配结果，并且优于UNI-LIMIT程序。申请数量的最佳限制是在无与伦比的匹配和总体上获得更好的匹配之间的权衡，如果毕业生对职位的偏好不是很相关的话，那么收益将是可观的。总体而言，我们提出了通过改善博士候选人的匹配结果并降低大学的招聘成本来改善博士学位候选人的匹配市场的方向。

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