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首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Game Theory >Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
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Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems

机译：关于择校问题的效率，公平性和一致性的偏好简介

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摘要

We study the school choice problem in which a school district assigns school seats to students. There has been a long debate over the three best-known rules for this problem: the deferred acceptance rule (DA), the top-trading cycles rule (TTC), and the immediate acceptance rule (IA). We evaluate these rules by investigating how often they satisfy three central requirements, efficiency, fairness, and consistency. We compare the restricted domains of students' preferences on which each rule satisfies these requirements. From the containment relations between them, we show that DA performs better than IA, which itself performs better than TTC in terms of efficiency and fairness. If we consider consistency instead, IA performs better than DA, which itself performs better than TTC.
机译：我们研究了学区选择问题，其中学区为学生分配了学校席位。关于此问题的三个最著名的规则一直存在着长期的争论：延迟接受规则（DA），最高交易周期规则（TTC）和立即接受规则（IA）。我们通过调查这些规则满足三个中心要求（效率，公平性和一致性）的频率来评估这些规则。我们比较了每个规则都满足这些要求的学生偏好的受限领域。从它们之间的遏制关系中，我们表明，DA的性能优于IA，IA的效率和公平性本身也优于TTC。如果我们考虑一致性，则IA的性能要好于DA，DA的性能要好于TTC。

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