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首页> 外文期刊>International journal of intelligence and counter intelligence >Breaking the Rules: The CIA and Counterinsurgency in the Congo 1964-1965
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Breaking the Rules: The CIA and Counterinsurgency in the Congo 1964-1965

机译：打破规则：中央情报局和刚果叛乱组织1964-1965年

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摘要

A good deal of recent scholarship and official discourse on the role of United States intelligence in the area of counterinsurgency has focused on the finer points of intelligence analysis in support of large-scale military operations.1 The assumption underlying this perspective is the idea that intelligence services will play a subordinate role to the military in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. This assumption is understandable, given the level of attention devoted to the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which itself is due in large part to the amount of national resources devoted to these two conflicts. One chief consequence of this focus is to marginalize the study of cases in which the U.S. government wanted to assist a friendly government's counterinsurgency efforts but has been unwilling to consider a significant military intervention.
机译：最近关于美国情报在平叛领域的作用的大量学术研究和官方论述都集中在情报分析以支持大规模军事行动方面。1这种观点所基于的假设是情报在进行平叛行动时，军事部门将对军队起次要作用。鉴于对阿富汗和伊拉克正在进行的行动的关注程度很高，这一假设是可以理解的，这本身主要是由于用于这两次冲突的国家资源的数量。这种关注的主要后果是使对美国政府希望协助友好政府的平叛努力但不愿考虑进行重大军事干预的案件的研究边缘化。

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